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Andrea Greppi, Madrid / Spain 
 
Ignorance and Political Representation in the Net 
On Public Infosphere and the Spanish ‘Indignants’ Movement  
 
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to explore the case of the Spanish ‘indignants’ movement of May 
2011 as an example of the structural changes occurring in the public sphere after the emergence of a 
new type of social movement characterized by the widespread use of the ICTs.  First I focus on the 
ideological dimension of discourse of the ‘indignants’ movement, so as to reconstruct the protesters’ 
self-image.  They  thought  that  ICTs  were  playing  a  prominent  role  in  a  wider  trend  towards  a 
regeneration of democracy, but they were rather misguided because they lack an accurate description 
of what really happened. In the second part of this paper I will challenge some features of my case 
study, emphasizing three basic elements of a democratic public sphere. I aim to call into question the 
idea that a ‘truly’ democratic public may be hosted by the emergent communicative environment. 
Keywords: Public Sphere, Social Movements, Participation, Political Information, Digital Democracy, 
E-democracy, ICTs 
 
I. Himmler Mouse wearing a Euro-Hat 
The Spanish ‘indignants’ were described by the public opinion as a social movement that 
emerged on the net. Not an old style peasant revolt, like those of the Ancien Régime, and not 
even a movement originating from the ‘civil society’, organized and politically aware, like 
those  of  the  90’s,  but  something  essentially  different,  with  a  revolutionary  aura.  It  was 
described by protesters and observers as a ‘wikirevolution’, because it circulated on Twitter 
and Facebook well before the conventional media notice its existence, notwithstanding its 
several tens of thousands of enthusiastic followers. Its nearest precedent in Spanish political 
history was the movement that exploded seven years before, in the afternoon of March 13
th, 
2004, two days after the terrorist bombing at the Atocha railways station, which caused nearly 
two hundred victims, just a day before the legislative elections, when a massive number of 
SMS messages ignited huge spontaneous protests of angry citizens demanding transparency. 
Those protests provoked a political turmoil that changed the electoral results, punishing the 
former  Government  that  tried  to  manipulate  evidence  regarding  responsibilities  for  the 
terrorist attack.
1 In the 13-M movement, in 2004, as  in the 15-M movement, in 2011, it was 
impossible to distinguish real voices of people marching in the streets and virtual ones 
crowding the electronic agora. Public opinion entered a state of extreme agitation. The public 
                                                           
1 Enrique Gil Calvo, 11/14 M. El cambio trágico: de la masacre al vuelco electoral, Adhara, Madrid 2005. 2 
sphere, in its multiple layers, formal and informal, was contaminated by a shared emotion. 
Boundaries between the ‘real’ and the ‘virtual’, the ‘common’ and the ‘private’, the ‘general’ 
and the ‘particular’ became fluid. 
The aim of this paper is to explore the case of the Spanish ‘indignants’ movement of May 
2011  as  an  example  of  the  structural  changes  occurring  in  the  public  sphere  after  the 
emergence of a new type of social movement characterized by the widespread use of the 
ICTs.  First I focus on the ideological dimension of discourse of the movement, so as to 
reconstruct the protesters’ self-image. They thought that ICTs were playing a prominent role 
in a wider trend towards a regeneration of democracy, but they were rather misguided because 
they lack an accurate description of what really happened (§2-3). In the second part of this 
paper I will challenge some features of my case study, emphasizing three basic elements of a 
democratic public sphere. I aim to call into question the idea that a ‘truly’ democratic public 
may be hosted by the emergent communicative environment (§4-7). 
 
II. The ‘indignants’ demands 
The central demands of the movement converged in the slogan ‘We are not represented’. 
Indeed, this is not a sophisticated revolutionary agenda, but rather an effective way to bring 
into the public eye the idea that parties and trade unions were not defending the interests of 
the social groups that were paying the highest price for the 2008 crisis: unemployed, young 
people and immigrants. That slogan was printed in red letters on a poster that covered an 
entire building at the ‘Puerta del Sol’, in Madrid, showing the face of Heinrich Himmler, the 
Nazi  Commander,  with  Mickey  Mouse’s  ears  and  wearing  a  hat  with  the  Euro  symbol 
stamped on his forehead. This amazing image was exposed at midnight on May 21
st, the 
precise moment when the measures banning political activism in the immediate time before 
the elections (24h) entered into force. The crowd in the square covered their mouths with 
bandages and, after a minute of silence, uncovered them and began to shout: ‘the voice of the 
people is not illegal’.  
 3 
 
 
A few days before, the evening of May 15
th, in Barcelona, in a similar atmosphere, the virtual 
encounters became real when thousands of people gathered around dozens of blank banners, 
lay down on the street, where everybody could write their own feelings. A protester reported: 
«There was an emotion floating in the air, a sense of leisure and relief, a therapeutic touch. 
Everyone was happy. At the end of the rally, in the Parc de la Ciutadella, I looked around and 
realized that I was not alone. «Most of us were carrying a banner which belonged to someone 
else».
2 
It is easy to imagine that the echo of what was happening in the streets was reverberating 
immediately on the net. The movement had ‘occupied’ simultaneously the real and the virtual 
space.  It  succeeded  in  transforming  both  spaces  into  a  genuine  tabula  rasa  on  which 
everything could happen, even the ‘unexpected’: that people could ask for ‘real democracy’. 
ﾫI clicked ‘I like it’ with passionﾻ, writes our witness. There was an explosion of political talk 
on the blogs. Ordinary people were able to discuss «without representatives, without party 
labels, just voicing the undeniable complaints against politicians and bankers. And a plea for 
unity». Then, the witness concludes:  
 
We behaved in the streets exactly in the same way we did on net. It was a widespread, transversal 
movement,  one  in  which  everyone  was  entitled  to  take  their  own  decisions,  and  where  the 
technical  work  of  the  software  designers  was  essential  to  ponder  the  common.  We  were 
demanding  anonymity  while  we  were  making  an  experience  of  real  and  free  participation, 
                                                           
2  Alba Muñoz, Del síndrome Wikileaks a la democracia 2.0. Las redes sociales y el 15M, in: A. Fernández 
Savater et alii, Las voces del 15M, Los panfletos del lince, Madrid 2011, 37. 4 
producing something that was collective. No one represented us, but we felt represented by that 
amorphous mass, in permanent mutation. It was not chaos but sheer participation. And we were 
not in a hurry, since we were thinking about what could be the best tools to use to participate in 
the society in which we are expected to participate. We did not realize before that day that 
Internet was generating a new social legitimacy, teaching us how to organize ourselves in a 
natural way, confronting the democratic institutions of the 21
st century. On the Internet, we were 
active, we selected and disseminated, and we criticized whatever we liked; the opposite of what 
usually happens in current politics, which is one-way, just like television: take it or leave it. 
Streets returned to the network what came from the network, but with a physical, necessary and 
definitive social experience which multiplied its strength because at the same time we have been 
transformed by it. At the camp [in Puerta del Sol] we discovered that freedom is not competition, 
an individual crusade, but lies in the ‘collective’. And that the Internet is also present in the 
street.
3  
 
The entire phenomenon was predictable and, at the same time, surprising. It was predictable 
because of the disenchantment and resentment caused by the economic crisis in which the 
country  entered  several  years  ago,  resulting  in  a  dramatic  erosion  of  social  expectations. 
Many needed an escape valve to express ‘indignation’. In fact, if news about the movement 
opened a window in the international mass-media even for just a few seconds it was not due 
to the ‘novelty’, nor to the number of citizens who joined the movement, but because it was a 
somehow ‘expected’ event, or at least not completely unexpected. But, at the same time, it 
was a surprising event, and not just because of the imaginative language chosen, including the 
image of Himmler Mouse, but because the entire event was perceived by the protesters, and 
by  the  general  public,  as  something  unexpected.  Everybody  who  was  ‘there’  felt  to  be 
attending a ‘unique’ event, which has the power of changing the course of history. And for 
those who were not there, it was ‘obvious’ that conventional media would inform them about 
something that was happening at that moment and that everybody perceived as ‘new’.  
 
III. What about e-democracy?  
Let us explore the protesters’ perception about the revolutionary features of their movement 
and, particularly, about the role of ICTs in that context. What can we say about the image they 
had of ‘real democracy’? Is it reasonable to share the indignados’ expectancy of a democratic 
improvement in the shifting of public debate from the physical to the virtual agora? 
Roughly  speaking,  the  outcome  of  the  widespread  application  of  communication 
technologies to the political debate is supposed to be the emergence of a new kind of public 
sphere,  characterized  by  horizontality  of  interaction,  dissemination  of  information  and 
control, and redistribution of social influence. It is obvious that it would be misleading to take 
these  results  for  granted  and,  especially,  their  implications  regarding  a  ‘deepening’  and 
                                                           
3 Ibidem, 41-3. 5 
‘strengthening’ of democracy. We should consider that we might have other upshots equally 
relevant  for  democratic  aspirations.  Changes  related  to  new  technologies  could  be  more 
superficial than we think and not really modify the basic structures of opinion and democratic 
will formation. People chat, bloggers talk, information flows, images circulate, but political 
processes  could  remain  approximately  the  same.  Moreover,  other  consequences  of  the 
upcoming age of net-society are equally possible. We can easily agree that technologies can 
promote attitudes and behaviors, but there is no evidence that the new ‘stage’ in democratic 
evolution we are approaching is going to be as democratic as expected and desired. Moreover, 
there  is  a  conceptual  difficulty:  it  cannot  be  asserted  in  advance  that  by  moving  to  the 
infosphere, ‘democracy’ remains the same. Whatever the changes, conceptual frameworks are 
needed in order to assess continuity and discontinuity between the two stages of democratic 
evolution. Ancient democracy, e.g. in Athens, became the modern liberal and representative 
democracy, and now a ‘third great transformation’ of democracy
4 in the post-national and 
informational political constellation would be in the offing. Can we claim, from a normative 
perspective, that we are witnessing the commencement of a new kind of (democratic) public 
sphere? Is there something specifically ‘democratic’ in the kind of changes we are facing? 
By turning back to our case study, we can easily recognize a clear dissonance between 
protesters perception of the movement and its political significance.
5 Behind the enthusiasm, 
we find a phenomenon that is hard to grasp because of its ambiguity. There are, at least, three 
main symptoms of instability which deserve our attention.  
The first problem is the protesters obstinate apprehension about the consistency of their 
action. They expressed the need to clarify what they were demanding, because in fact there 
was no previous agenda, no ready-to-use design of what ‘real’ democracy should ‘really’ look 
like. Some considered these worries to be a sign of authenticity and meaningful commitment, 
while other regarded them as evidence of ingenuity and disinformation. There is something 
paradoxical in this situation. After days of talking, and despite the ‘alternative’ attitude that 
constantly prevailed in the assemblies, the movement adopted a very conventional list of 
proposals: electoral law reform in order to introduce open lists in the elections, more attention 
to  the  fundamental  rights  recognized  in  the  Constitution,  abolition  of  unjust  and 
discriminatory  legal  norms,  income  tax  to  defend  the  poorest,  abolition  of  privileges  for 
                                                           
4 Robert Dahl, Democracy and its critics, Yale UP, New Haven 1989.  
5 Obviously, this assessment should be contrasted with observational data that are not available. However, the 
overall impression is that the new circuit of alternative participation is not as ‘independent’ as we might assume 
from the traditional political processes. Realistically, we could say that it is one of its many reflected images. As 
a matter of fact, the movement was shaped by the proximity of the elections, which excited the media and 
brought attention to the discontent in the public. 6 
politicians, rejection and social condemnation of corruption, control of banking activity and 
financial markets, participative and direct democracy in which citizens can take an active part, 
dismissing  of  nuclear  power  plants,  etc.  In  its  anxious  search  for  ‘concreteness’  ─  they 
wanted ‘real democracy, right now’, ‘Sol-utions, right now’ ─ the (alleged) revolutionary 
character of the movement seemed to vanish. The illusion of immediacy, always powerful on 
the net, became a dangerous snare: it opened the way to frustration. The easiest reply to such 
an overdose of political romanticism, on Twitter or otherwise, with a simple gesture of the 
hand, could be to say: ‘You see: it is worthless!’ 
The second problem is the need for organization, clearly perceived by the protesters. 
Reminiscent of old communist fantasies, people at the camp created from the outset a number 
of ‘commissions’ in order to manage the occupation of the Puerta del Sol and other places 
throughout  the  country.  This  search  for  ‘organization’  is  closely  related  to  the  virtual 
dimension  of  the  movement.  In  the  text  quoted  above,  our  witness  talks  about  the 
responsibility  of  experts,  technicians  of  the  web  who  have  the  expertise  to  produce  the 
instruments needed ─ in protesters’ words ─ to ‘ponder the common’ (sic!). This recalls a 
tricky aspect in the standard theory of democracy. It is not as easy as indignados believed to 
develop discursive tools to ‘balance’ interests and values within the domain of public reason.
6 
But, every complication seemed out of place at the camp site. People were persuaded to talk 
‘freely’. They thought to have learned from the net how to organize communication in a 
‘natural’ way. ‘The Internet is on the street’. It is not difficult to understand why, as soon as 
emotional  tension  started  to  decline,  ‘spontaneous’  organization  faded  and  blogs  became 
outdated. ‘We are moving to the neighborhoods’, ‘we will camp into the consciousness’, said 
the last indignants when the camp was dismantled.  
The third problem is related to the expressive nature of the movement. Willingness to 
participate  in  a  potentially  boundless  arena  pushed  rational  argumentation  into  the 
background. Network communication is characterized by the constant and arbitrary mutation 
of interpretative frames. There is little room for giving and taking reasons. Communicative 
performances are mostly reduced to their iconic value. It is worth observing, at this point, that 
there  are  many  differences  between  the  former  ‘new’  social  movements  and  the  ones 
emerging  today  in  the  infosphere.  In  the  previous  generation,  political  claims  retained  a 
certain  degree  of  homogeneity,  as  long  as  they  were  related  to  the  demands  of  specific 
(marginalized) groups, with their own interests. Those movements spoke on behalf of the 
general interest, i.e. as they said, on behalf of the ‘common’ good. On the contrary, what we 
                                                           
6 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, Columbia UP, New York 1996. 7 
have now is a situation that can be described ─ in Habermas’ terms, but well beyond his 
intentions
7 ─ as a world of ‘communication without subject’. In our example, we may ask: 
who are ‘they’, the ‘indignants’? Are the individuals who were present at the rally ─ with 
their private interest and desires, experiences and rights ─ the same ‘persons’ when they enter 
the virtual space or go to the ballot box? I think that the answers to these questions are not far 
from obvious. Behind whatever the protesters do, behind every action performed in the street 
or in the net, in the private or in the public realm, there is a shifting hypertext that modifies its 
meaning.  
 
IV. Framework: ascending legitimization and material culture  
In a case like the one we are talking about an assessment that focuses exclusively on short 
term consequences would be superficial. It would be unwise to only consider massive changes 
occurring in communication devices, amazing ease of informative dissemination, increased 
opportunities  for  participation  or  the  improved  performance  of  agencies  in  public 
administration.  It  would  also  be  simplistic  to  be  seduced  by  the  novelty  and  assert  that 
technological revolution leads directly to the birth of a ‘new’ public sphere.   
In what follows some of the characteristic aspects of our case study will be identified and 
set  in  a  broader  context.  The  purpose  is  to  explore  the  protesters’  attitude  towards  the 
‘democratic’ character of the new infosphere. We must focus on citizen’s self-determination
8 
so as to identify three basic  structural elements of every democratic public sphere: (1) the 
subject ─ that is the ‘public’ who is supposed to participate; (2) the rules which govern the 
process of opinion- and decision-making; and, finally, (3) the practices that characterize the 
functioning of democratic society.
9  
 
V. A phantom public and a de-structured community  
In a dispersed political network, like that of the indignants movement, what is the citizens’ 
role in a democratic public? As we already know, indignants did not feel represented by 
                                                           
7 Jürgen Habermas, Between facts and norms, MIT Press, Cambridge 1996. 
8 The basic condition of political equality without which can say that there is no democracy at all; see, among the 
many others, Michelangelo Bovero, Contro il governo dei peggiori. Una grammatica della democrazia, Laterza, 
Roma-Bari, 2000. 
9 The background to understand our case study is the disturbing inconsistency between frameworks of political 
communication and the 'material culture' which determines the transition to the ‘Networked’ society. Peoples’ 
demands and hopes do not flow into the Web of ‘water channels’, which regulate the ‘stream’ of political power. 
Note, by the way, that adjustments between practices and material resources do not go in just one direction. 
Ideals and values behind political action are not independent from social, economic and technological conditions 
of the environment and, vice versa, the material environment is partially related to culturally determined 
behavior patterns. For an approach to the concept of ‘material culture’, Fernando Broncano, La melancolía del 
ciborg, Herder, Madrid 2009. 8 
conventional democratic institutions. But, what alternatives do they see? The virtual agora 
should not be compared with that of the ancient Greeks, or with that of the enlightened civil 
society that flourished in the early Modern Age, and not even with the 1848 revolutionary 
assemblies  that  took  place  in  Paris.  In  the  network  society  there  is  a  far-reaching  trend 
towards  fragmentation  that  should  be  considered.  There  could  be  many  kinds  of  virtual 
communities, but they all are going to be fragmented communities of dispersed selves. This is 
a  long-lasting  topic  in  contemporary  sociological  literature
10, as well as in democratic 
theory.
11  My observation here is that: public that emerged in our case study was not 
substantially different from those fragmented and dispersed ‘phantom publics’ we had in the 
old days of mass politics.  
Indeed, the central features of our virtual public replicates those that Walter Lippmann 
pointed  out  in  describing  the  state  of  public  opinion  in  the  early  1920s.
12  Following 
Lippmann’s  suggestions,  it  is  unlikely  that  cyber-citizens  may  have  a  strong  political 
commitment, since they do not have enough information to deal with the huge amount of data 
offered by the Internet. Far from fortifying the public spirit, the informational overload is 
likely to produce a defensive reaction. Citizens are once again reduced to ignorance, a new 
kind of ignorance, and forced to withdraw from the public arena. The rational response is to 
become ‘deaf’ to unbearable informational opportunities, just as the attention to the facts and 
the appetite for theory is not unlimited. Modern society, says Lippmann and we can easily 
echo his remark in the context of the Net-society, is not transparent, at least not to everybody. 
Partial sections within society are visible to another sections, series of events are intelligible 
for particular groups, but not for others, and life is too short to pursue omniscience. 
So, what is the main difference between the public in mass-society and the one in the net-
society?  There  is  more  than  one  difference  for  sure,  and  this  is  not  the  right  place  to 
summarize a whole century of public opinion studies. Nonetheless, I will try to outline a 
crucial change we are dealing with, stressing not only the inadequacy of Lippmann’s analysis, 
but rather the weakness of the traditional responses he received from adversaries, advocates of 
participatory democracy. In his famous reply, John Dewey
13 faced the difficulties raised by 
Lippmann arguing that the deep inconsistencies between patterns of socialization and material 
progress in industrial societies would disappear once the migration from the Great Society to 
                                                           
10 Z. Bauman, In search of politics, Stanford UP, Stanford 1999; Ulrich Beck, Individualization, SAGE, London 
2002. 
11 Robert Putnam, Bowling alone. The collapse and revival of American community, Simon & Schuster, New 
York 2000; Donatella Campus, Comunicazione politica, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2008. 
12  Walter Lippmann, The phantom public, Harcourt, Brace, New York 1925, passim. 
13  John Dewey, The public and its problems, Holt and Company, New York, 1927, passim. 9 
the Great Community took place. Given the disintegration of small communities that provided 
psychological  stability  to  individuals,  and  realized  the  proliferation  of  amorphous  and 
inarticulate,  fuzzy  and  scattered  publics,  Dewey  faced  the  problem  ─  ‘primary’  and 
‘essentially intellectual’ ─ of the making of a democratic audience. He assumed that ‘ties’ that 
bind men in action are numerous, strong and subtle enough to sustain human communication. 
And  this  is  precisely  the  point.  In  the  Networked  society,  the  tools  used  to  construct  a 
democratic  public  are  becoming  ever  more  inadequate  than  they  were  in  the  early  20
th 
Century. Mass-media has been radically challenged and has given up its educational goals. 
‘Physical tools’ for communication have been enhanced to such an unimaginable degree, but 
thoughts  and  aspirations  have  never  become  ─  as  protester  hoped  ─  truly  ‘common’. 
Rephrasing Dewey, the ‘public’ remains eclipsed and formless, lost in a spasmodic search of 
itself, embracing its shadow rather than its substance.  
Previous observations can be summarized as follows: there can be no democracy without 
a public. Is it thus reasonable to claim that the ‘indignants’ movement is the ‘real’ public that 
lies behind a ‘real’ democracy?  Let us answer this question by following Dewey, once more. 
In The public and its problems Dewey argued that communities can be stable without being 
static, so they can evolve without disintegrating. In a similar way, it could be argued that, in 
the present day, the innumerable and complex flows of virtual associations can converge in a 
space in which the many particular experiences and the various conflicting interests could be 
challenged and discussed, fueling smaller and intimate unions of human beings who live in 
close contact with each other. This sounds like the utopia of a Virtual Great Community. Is it 
an adequate description of what is really happening? And if not, what is left? 
Dewey  pursued  a  dream  of  commonality  in  which  stabilization  of  the  public  was 
ultimately located at the local level, in the short distance, where face-to-face communication 
would still possible. He was persuaded that happiness can only be found in the enduring ties 
with  others,  where  interpersonal  links  go  beyond  the  conscious  experience  to  form  an 
enduring endowment. Needless to say, this is an experience that cannot be associated to the 
instant  and ephemeral encounters  that our ‘indignados’ depicted.  It is  true that protesters 
camped out at the Puerta del Sol, with the revolutionary charm of the 'first time', thought that 
they had found that magic that sometimes springs from 'face-to-face' encounters. But these are 
not the kind of long-lasting and profound commitments Dewey was talking about. We live in 
a time of instant surfing. The 'Technological era' is increasingly far from being 'absorbed' into 
a new 'human era' as the one Dewey envisioned, in which the public can solve its most urgent 10 
problem:  that  of  finding  and  identifying  itself,  revealing  a  completeness,  a  variety  and 
freedom that is unseen in present social associations. 
Actually, I would add, ‘community’ is not the most pressing challenge in contemporary 
democracies,  but  instead  the  aspiration  of  creating  an  'auditorium'  for  significant 
communication,  a  ‘forum’  in  which  communicative  actions  can  be  conducing  to 
‘understanding’.
14  Putting  aside  moral  and  technical  issues  about  communication,  what  is 
needed is to clarify what reasons citizens may have to communicate and to make sense, in a 
critical  way,  of  the  information  that  circulates  in  the  communicative  space.  Without  that 
motivation, voices tend to accumulate and overlap randomly, becoming e-noise, and access to 
information and transparency ─ the great political values, and hopes, of the infosphere ─ are 
likely to be neutralized. Without a democratic public, information cannot circulate and costs 
of selection of information increase exponentially, becoming untenable for individuals. In that 
situation,  cyber-cascades  and  echo-chambers  proliferate
15, and polarization of opinion is 
doomed to become endemic. The digital divide is no longer between those who are connected 
to the Web and those who are not, but is an internal gap between who have the know-how for 
surfing on the Net, putting data into contexts, and the massive and disseminated people of 
data consumers, confined to the remote periphery of a structurally asymmetric communication 
system.
16  
 
VI. The movement’s voice and its representation 
The  second  stage  in  the  construction  of  a  democratic  infosphere  regards  political 
representation. It has been proved in history that without a ‘constitution’, i.e. a set of publicly 
recognized rules which determines who governs and how, democratic government cannot be 
achieved.  It  is  a  conventional  point  in  literature  that,  in  a  context  of  increased  social 
complexity and institutional ungovernability, those rules tend to become ineffective.
17 And it 
is obvious that massive dissemination of the ITCs can multiply these effects.  
Once again, indignants’ motto was, precisely, 'We are not represented'. They felt that 
politicians did not speak in their name, but also that others could eventually do better. Early 
on, the movement raised the debate about the different ways to institutionalize participation, 
                                                           
14 I borrow these terms from Chaïm Perelman, Traité de l’argumentation: la nouvelle rhétorique, PUF, Paris 
1958; Jon Elster, The Market and the Forum, in: Contemporary political philosophy: an anthology, eds. R. 
Goodin, P. Pettit, 1997; and Jürgen Habermas (note 7). 
15 Cass Sunstein, Gong to extremes. How like minds unite and divide, Oxford UP, New York 2009. 
16 Here my nearest references are Cass Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0, Princeton UP, Princeton 2009; Matthew 
Hindman, The myth of digital democracy, Princeton UP, Princeton 2009; and Manuel Castells, Communication 
Power, Oxford UP, Oxford 2009. 
17 For a survey on democracy and complexity, see Danilo Zolo, Il principato democratico, Feltrinelli, Milano 
1996; James Bohman, Public deliberation: pluralism, complexity and democracy, MIT Press, Cambridge 2000. 11 
but their responses were not particularly original: open lists, proportional representation, anti-
corruption rules, elimination of privileges for politicians, and effective separation of powers. 
More important than this is observing how the movement insisted in subscribing the ideal of 
specular correspondence, according to which a political system is ‘more’ democratic when it 
is able to ‘reflect’, like a mirror, the will of the people. 
The  fundamental  trouble  of  representation  ─  the  question  of  whether  and  how  it  is 
possible that the will of the ‘multitude’, which is by definition ‘absent’, could ‘appear’ and 
become  ‘present’
18  ─  has  not  been  completely  resolved  despite  the  range  of  institutional 
resources developed over the last two centuries. The significant point here is the following: 
the protesters’ narrative was not able to recognize the structural change that occurred in the 
public sphere when a centralized scheme of legitimization ─ based on the central role and the 
supremacy  of  the  legislature  ─  was  replaced  by  a  radically  decentralized  and  horizontal 
scheme  of  decision-making  (and  law-making).  When  the  focus  of  democratic  will 
disappeared, the ‘mirror’ people used to view their own image reflected into disappeared as 
well. Thus, the presence of the new ICTs is just one among the several factors, perhaps the 
trigger, but not the only relevant factor, that leads to a change in political representation.
19 
Representation evolves in parallel to the transformation of 'material culture', that is according 
to economic and social infrastructure, institutional apparatus, instruments of social control, 
channels of production and reproduction of knowledge, and so on. 
A brief survey of the history of poli tical ideas proves that point. There is no need to 
explain the reasons why the classical model of representation, coming from Burke and Sieyès, 
declined with globalization. In the old days, the ‘natural’ representative ─ the ‘best’ men of 
each territory and each group of interest ─ deliberated with their peers to discover the ‘real’ 
national interest. But, can we assert that something akin to a general  will awaiting to be 
‘discovered’ really exist? Likewise, the proposal of John Stuart Mill, with his faith in the 
educational virtues of the Supreme deliberative body, faces similar worries. In a situation of 
high social complexity, what reasons could we have to assume that the ‘best’ interest of a part 
of society, is going to be compatible with the interest ─ or the happiness ─ of the other parts? 
Moreover, today the standard liberal model, stretching from Madison to Schumpeter, is not 
less controversial than the participative one. Even in the case of Schumpeter, who is always 
skeptical on this issue, a certain degree of epistemic competence is needed. Citizens should be 
                                                           
18 Here the standard reference is Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch. 16. 
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able  to  identify  who  are  the  best  administrators  of  their  interests.  This  is  the  minimal 
condition for the exercise of an effective control over representatives’ performances.  
In the network society, it seems to me that the crucial point is to know if citizens can 
make  use  of  the  new  communicative  potential  they  have  in  the  infosphere,  avoiding  the 
current trends towards personalization and spectacularization of politics, which characterize 
present audience democracies.
20 It is possible to emphasize the contra -hegemonic nature of 
the new virtual and spontaneous mobilizations, but we should not forget that spaces of 
communication  can  be  easily  ‘colonized’  by  narratives  that  simply  replicate  the  contents 
found  in  the  conventional  mass-media  system.  Power  is  likely  to  be  destabilized  in  an 
environment with a highly fragmented public, unable to satisfy the primary demands of social 
integration. Finally, this is the only acceptable interpretation we can make of the hopeless 
aphasia of the indignants, who have proven to enjoy a remarkable capacity of producing 
powerful icons, but yet are absolutely trivial when they try to articulate their own discourse. 
This aphasia must not be attributed to the evil will of a system which hides information and 
conspires  against  the  people.
21  The tangle is elsewhere. Purely   horizontal  communication 
faces  its  own  limits  when  it  fails  to  produce  any  substantial  change  in  the  (unequal) 
distribution of ‘communicative power’. What is at stake in the transition to the mass-society 
to the democratic infosphere is a problem of authority: the anarchic proliferation of Networks 
does not make us more free and equal.
22 
 
VII. Epistemic snares in the making of a democratic (info)sphere 
The reading of the many blogs that flourished around the 15-M provide us an exhaustive ─ 
and, frankly, a bit boring ─ picture of the ‘voices’ the system supposedly fails to represent. 
Unfortunately, the lack of quality cannot be compensated by increased quantity. In response 
to that criticism, emphasis can be put in the affirmative value of participation. It is a good 
thing, it must be said, that everybody talks, whatever they say, because people ‘feel’ better if 
they  do  talk  and,  in  the  long  run,  all  that  ‘stuff’  reinforces  political  trust.  However,  the 
disproportionate emphasis on the therapeutic and iconic dimension of participation challenges 
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the quality of the democratic process. If the only valuable thing is to talk, and nobody cares 
about what the others say, the distance between what people ‘merely’ say and the ‘serious’ 
conversation among the experts is doomed inevitably to increase. And this is not ─ I suppose 
─ what supporters of e-participation are looking for.  
At this stage of the argument we should carefully reflect about ignorance and, especially, 
about the new ‘forms’ of ignorance that emerges in the information society. It is not ignorance 
that  the  network  communication  system  can  correct  by  itself,  increasing  the  volume  of 
information, improving the tools of recovery or the performances of communication facilities. 
What characterizes this form of ignorance is a shift in the sources of epistemic authority.  
Again, let us take a quick look at the past: Ignorance and education are crucial factors in 
the development of democracy ever since the Greeks. Without going back that far, we should 
stress  Rousseau’s  thesis  about  the  infallibility  of  the  general  will,  which  implies  a  deep 
epistemological and educational commitment: every citizen, if properly educated, could make 
the ‘right’ decision that all members of a democratic society would accept. The mathematical 
reframing of this stance leads to Condorcet’s theorem. The hypothesis is that citizens ─ each 
single citizen or the average citizen ─ are more likely to be right than to be wrong in judging 
matters that affect their interests. The liberal translation of this idea focused on the capacity of 
each single citizen to be the best judge of his own affairs. The elitists later criticized this 
assumption by emphasizing that, in modern societies, Government should be in the hands of 
technocrats and educated bureaucrats with a strong sense of responsibility. For the rest of the 
people  it  is  perfectly  rational  to  calculate,  according  to  the  circumstances,  what  the 
appropriate level of disinformation in public affairs should be. Information is a costly good 
that everybody cannot afford. 
Turning back to the infosphere, my suggestion is the following: the ideal of a network of 
communication, horizontal and anarchic by ‘nature’, purely transparent, generates a form of 
ignorance  which  is  neither  blameworthy  ─  the  ignorance  of  who  consciously  remains  in 
lifelong immaturity, in Kantian terms ─, nor educated ─ the Socratic ignorance ─ as when 
someone says:  ‘I do not think I know what I  do not know’ ─, but  rather rational.
23 The 
information  overload  to  which  ‘netizens’  are  exposed  bears  a  radical  challenge  for 
democracy: the individual ─ the citizen, the voter ─ encounters an increasing difficulty to 
elaborate his or her own opinion. Democracy is ‘dying for information’. The overwhelming 
increase of information created by the Web thwarts the emancipatory potential that could be 
attached to e-democracy. This is so both from the point of view of the individual ─ what 
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would participation mean if there is no autonomous opinion? ─ and from the point of view of 
the political system, since institutional devices of transparency are systematically overridden 
by  the  abysmal  difference  between  citizens  who  have  the  resources  to  manage  the 
information,  and  citizens  who  do  not.  The  key  is  the  capacity  to  transform  (‘upgrade’) 
information  into  knowledge,  assessing  the  ‘truth’  of  the  messages,  the  ‘soundness’  of 
opinions, elaborating significant narratives, those are needed to ‘give an account’ of data and 
‘match’ the experience.
24 And this is precisely what indignants movement lacked. 
 
VIII. Deliberation, agency, and motivational force 
What are then the prospects of democratization on the blogosphere? How democratic are 
experiences of participation like those we are dealing with? I already suggested that these 
questions should be answered by looking at some structural features of a democratic public 
sphere: the social ties that transform the multitude into a public, the rules of according to 
which someone is authorized to speak on behalf of the other, and the epistemic conditions 
needed for citizens’ opinion to become an autonomous opinion.  
Without  straying  away  from  the  Spanish  example,  I  shall  indicate  just  two  main 
perspectives  we  may  use  to  analyze  the  movement  and  assess  its  significance  for  the 
improvement of democracy. Then, I will point out two conflicting forces which are going to 
determine the final outcomes. 
On one hand, the first perspective concerns the opportunities that political and social 
actors may have to democratize the Network, participating in formal or informal, conventional 
or non-conventional manners. There is a delicate question here, since not every enhancement 
of the movement can be interpreted as a ‘triumph’ of democracy. This is no more than a 
prejudice, which appears in two different ways. First, in the populist version, democratization 
originates in the citizens’ right to access the places in which political authority resides, the 
right to have a ‘voice’ and be ‘heard’, in accordance with the idea that all views are equal and 
decisions should be taken by simply counting heads. Second, in the elitist version, the aim is 
to  enhance  discussion  within  the  different  partial  sections  of  the  fragmented  network,  in 
government institutions, civil society organizations, epistemic communities, etc., because ─ 
this is the point ─ educated deliberation leads to the right answer. Elitist encourage control 
among peers and foster the leadership skills of the best, the few who ‘listen’ and ‘respond’ to 
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the outsiders’ interests.
25 In this situation, the only information that is due to the public ─ and 
the only information the system is rationally required to give ─ is that which allows them to 
understand  how  well  expert  communities  do  their  work,  since  there  is  a  general  need  to 
preserve peoples’ trust in the system. To summarize, the idea of a natural tendency that leads 
spontaneously  from  social  movements  to  democracy  is  misleading.  A  movement  is 
democratic or not depending on its capacity to empower citizens’ autonomy.  
On the other hand, we should take into consideration the potential of partial deliberative 
publics, like those that flourish within and around the movement, to produce legitimacy by 
themselves, auto-referentially, without the support of a comprehensive public sphere. There is 
one  more  disturbing  prejudice  to  confront  here,  which  is  the  faith  in  the  horizontal  and 
anarchic proliferation of self-referring publics, lacking any external control. If the give and 
take  of  reasons  loses  its  distinctive  openness,  'public’  conversation  fails  to  produce 
legitimacy.  The  point  here  concerns  not  only  the  ‘atomization’  of  the  individuals  in  the 
Networked  society,  but  also  the  informational  basis  of  legitimacy.  Confined  within 
themselves,  lacking  any  external  feedback,  fragmented  communities  begin  to  spin  in  the 
vacuum. This observation could be taken as a general rule. Consider, on a small scale, the 
conversation among citizens who only see the ‘world’ through the limited number of links 
that appear on their screens. There is no need to insist in how damaging this could be for a 
democratic process of political self-determination. But consider as well, on a larger scale, the 
functioning of the global network of financial markets, which is extremely isolated from its 
environment. This kind of network is mainly responsive to the information produced by itself. 
This can make the system stronger, but also can determine its failure. Actually, far from being 
a marginal cost, offset by the overall benefits, the absence of reliable external control in the 
long term can jeopardize the stability of the system. The turning point is when the increased 
volume of internal information begins to intensify uncertainty and system instability, that is, 
when the system loses the capacity to control its own information. In the political realm, the 
lesson seems to be that democracy requires information, but the increased complexity arising 
from multiple and dispersed publics make democracy fragile.
26 
Therefore, instead of offering a steadfast answer about democ racy in an latest social 
movement,  like  the  Spanish  ‘indignados’,  two  basic  dimensions  of  analysis  should  be 
explored: capacities and openness. Any further assessment needs to take into consideration 
two opposite motivational forces as well; forces that lead our Networked societies in the 
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opposite directions of a strengthened and a weakened democracy. On the one hand, there is a 
compulsion towards an authoritarian regression, be it technocratic, populist, or both. Here the 
temptation is to restrict the anarchical proliferation of virtual communication, compressing the 
public space, in order to balance the information overload that threatens social integration. 
This does not necessary means to reduce the volume of information available to citizens. It is 
sufficient  control  the  instruments  they  need  to  select  information.  The  cost  we  pay  in 
following this strategy is the surrender of political equality. On the other hand, we have the 
force that comes from the citizens’ malaise, and particularly, from the feeling of a systematic 
mismatch between their everyday experience in a world saturated with information, and the 
interpretive  frames  used  to  describe  peoples’  desires  and  aspirations,  interests  and  needs. 
Which  one  of  these  two  conflicting  forces  ─  the  one  that  leads  to  a  new  authoritarian 
involution and the one that fosters democratic conversation ─ are going to prevail? This is not 
a suitable place for prophecies. 
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